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Abstract 
Nowadays, several of the situations in which we have to make decisions are in digital form. In a 
first experiment (N=1010) we showed that people’s moral judgments depend on the Digital Context 
(Smartphone vs. PC) in which a dilemma is presented, becoming more utilitarian (vs. 
deontological) when using Smartphones in high conflict moral dilemmas. To provide additional 
evidence, we ran a second (N=250) and a third experiment (N=300), where we introduced time 
constraints and we manipulated time instructions. Our results provide an extended perspective on 
Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment, as we showed that the use of smartphones, often assumed 
to be hurried which would be consistent with gut-feeling decision-making, increased the likelihood 
of utilitarian responses and decreased deontological ones. We suggest that the increase in utilitarian 
judgments is a result of inducing high construal, increasing psychological distance and giving rise 
to an abstract representation of actions. A fourth experiment (N=1211), where we measured 
psychological distance, provided some first evidence for our hypotheses. This is one of the first 
studies to look at the impact of the digital age on moral judgments and the results presented have 
consequences for understanding moral choice in our increasingly virtualized world.  
Keywords: moral judgment, behavioural ethics, decision-making, human-computer 
interaction. 
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General Introduction 
Context-Dependent Dual-Process Models in Moral Judgment 
In this digital age, we spend a lot of time interacting with computer screens, smartphones and other 
digital gadgets. We buy online, work on the cloud, our social relationships are sometimes online-
based, etc. Thus, the contexts where we typically face ethical decisions and are asked to engage in 
moral behaviour have changed. Nowadays, moral dilemmas are often presented digitally, that is, 
relevant information is presented through and decisions are made on a technological device. 
A key distinction regarding moral judgments concerns deontological versus utilitarian 
decisions (Singer, 1991; Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Recent dual-process accounts of moral judgment 
contrast deontological judgments, which are generally driven by automatic/unreflective/intuitive 
responses, prompted by the emotional content of a given dilemma, with utilitarian responses, which 
are the result of unemotional/rational/controlled reflection, driven by conscious evaluation of the 
potential outcomes (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 
2007). In this account, an individual’s ethical mind-set (rule-based vs. outcome-based, 
corresponding author of this manuscript, 2015; Cornelissen et al., 2013) can play a central role. A 
deontological perspective evaluates an act based on its conformity to a moral norm (Kant, 
1785/1959) or perhaps just a rule (such a law). By contrast a consequentialist/utilitarian perspective 
evaluates an act depending on its consequences (Mill, 1861/1998).  
People often believe that judgments about “right” and “wrong” should be consistent and 
unaffected by irrelevant aspects of a moral dilemma or by its context. However, studies have 
shown, for example, that manipulations of the language (foreign vs. mother tongue) in which a 
moral scenario is presented can affect moral judgments through increasing psychological distance 
from the situation, and so inducing utilitarianism (Costa et al, 2014). The choice of deontological 
versus utilitarian judgments can vary depending on the emotional reactivity triggered by the 
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dilemma (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). As such, establishing which 
conditions favor each of these two influences is fundamental to understanding the psychology of 
moral choice.  
The present study explores whether a Digital Context (i.e. using a digital device such a 
Smartphone or a PC, as hundreds of millions of individuals do every day) can have a systematic 
impact on these processes.  
 
Construal Level Theory, Psychological Distance and Digital Contexts 
Instead of relying on affect-centered explanations, we propose that the relationship between 
deontology and consequentialism would benefit from analyses in terms of information processing. 
How is the information relevant to deontological considerations different from that relevant to 
consequentialist considerations? What causes people to adopt one or the other mode of decision-
making?  
Construal Level Theory (CLT) provides a framework of considerable potential relevance by 
linking mental representations to moral judgment. Individuals’ judgments, decisions, and 
behaviours can differ as a function of construal levels. CLT proposes that the same event or object 
can be represented at multiple levels of abstraction (see Trope & Liberman, 2010, for a review). 
More weight is given to global, abstract features at high-level construal, whereas local, concrete 
features are more influential at low-level construal. According to CLT, psychological distance is a 
major determinant of what level of construal is activated. Distancing a target on any dimension of 
psychological distance (i.e., time, space, social, and hypotheticality) leads to greater activation of 
high-level construal (directing attention to end states) than low-level construal (Liberman et al., 
2002). Crucially, high-level construal is often assumed to align with more utilitarian decision-
making (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Indeed, Gong et al. (2012) examined the idea of whether a 
person focuses on actions or outcomes while making moral choices depends on the psychological 
distance from the moral situation. They found that when the situation is perceived as far off, 
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whether in time or space, consequentialist considerations loom larger; establishing that 
psychological distance from an event decreases deontological judgments and increases 
consequentialist choices. Furthermore, Aguilar et al. (2013) examined whether psychological 
distance gives rise to an abstract representation of actions that make goals more prominent and can 
help us ignore their immediate effects. In three experiments they confirmed that psychological 
distance increase consequentialism. In other words, that different manipulations of psychological 
distance increased participants' consequentialist choices. In a nutshell, higher psychological 
distance gives rise to an abstract representation of actions that makes goals more prominent and can 
help us ignore the immediate affective impact of actions. And conversely, deontological judgments 
are more associated with psychological closeness due to the link between low-level construal and a 
focus on means.  
The way some of the technological devices we use nowadays influence our decision-making 
capabilities and behaviours is unclear. Could Digital Contexts induce different construal levels 
(through psychological distance)? From a historical perspective, Kiesler et al. (1984) and Walther 
(1996) were amongst the first to discuss how social psychological research might contribute to a 
deeper understanding of computer-mediated communication (CMC) specifically and of computers 
and technological change in society more generally. Although some of their studies indicated that 
CMC might be impersonal, a number of reports also showed a more personal CMC interaction, 
sometimes just as personal as face-to-face (FtF) interaction. They argued that perhaps the medium 
had no consistent effects but that different conditions surrounding CMC use lead to the contrasting 
results. More recently, Shaw et al., (2016) presented the first empirical study that explores some 
individual differences that exist between users of particular brands of smartphone devices. For 
example, in comparison to Android users, they found that iPhone owners are more likely to be 
female, younger, and increasingly concerned about their smartphone being viewed as a status 
object. Key differences in personality were also observed with iPhone users displaying lower levels 
of Honesty-Humility and higher levels of emotionality. In the present work, rather than focusing on 
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specific smartphone brands, we take a step back and we focus on smartphones, as a general 
technological device, and we use PCs as a control group.  
There has been a lot of literature focusing on time stress and judgements (Svenson et al., 
1985; Entin et al., 1990), but in specific, we are interested in the so called “narrowing effect”, 
which means that individuals channel or tunnel their focus toward a main task and ignore or filter 
out certain cues. For example, Svenson et al., (1985) showed in a series of studies this effect when 
people were asked to choose apartments. Among all the different elements to consider about an 
apartment (such as size, quality, and distance from work), people who were put under time pressure 
focused primarily on the distance from work and underweighted all other criteria. More 
importantly, there is evidence that people experience the "narrowing effect” when using 
smartphones in decision-making (Ariely, 2016). A narrowing effect is consistent with the idea that 
devices such as smartphones would increase psychological distance giving rise to an abstract 
representation of actions. In other words, the narrowing effect would seem to be aligned with a 
more utilitarian/ outcome-based mind-set, instead of a more emotional/ deontological one.  
For this reason we asked ourselves whether Digital Context, smartphone vs. PC, might 
influence the relation between different levels of construal (psychological distance), thus affecting 
the likelihood of utilitarian vs. deontological judgments. A complicating consideration concerns the 
impact of time in moral decision-making on smartphones vs. PCs. In general, more hurried or time-
pressured responses are thought to be aligned with more emotional/ gut feeling (i.e. deontological) 
decisions (i.e. Suter and Hertwig, 2011). Therefore, if smartphones are associated with more hurried 
or time-pressured responses (e.g., when serving as a default option for staying informed in a fast 
way, quickly checking email, getting from place to place, sharing moments in social media, sending 
brief messages, etc.), relative to PCs, then we would expect moral judgments on smartphones to 
likewise be biased towards deontological decisions. However, a contrasting perspective is our 
hypothesis that, even under conditions of time pressure, some digital contexts (i.e. Smartphones) 
could trigger utilitarian decision-making. We support this idea by the so called "narrowing effect” 
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introduced above and by the recent results from Kusev et al. (2016) that suggest that variation in 
accessibility of utilitarian information can produce variation in moral choices, with rational choices 
taking less time in certain conditions. This latter hypothesis gains credibility if we further consider 
that Smartphone use may not always be hurried or time-pressured (e.g., consider an individual in a 
train journey, using his/her smartphone to pass time).  
To summarize, we hypothesize that Smartphones (vs. PCs) have the effect of channeling or 
tunneling the focus toward a main task at the expense of certain cues. This should induce high 
construal, increase psychological distance and give rise to an abstract representation of actions, thus 
biasing towards more utilitarian judgments. There is a potentially conflicting hypothesis, according 
to which, if Smartphone use is consistently hurried and time-pressured that would instead reveal a 
deontological bias. We first tested this prediction using three versions of the well-known Trolley 
Problem (Switch, Fat Man, Balanced; Thomson, 1985; see Methods sections). To provide 
additional support we also ran a second and a third experiment where we introduced a Time 
Constraint (10 seconds vs. Unlimited Time to respond) and where we manipulated Time 
Instruction, relating to how participants were given information about the time constraints for 
reaching a decision (Instructing Unlimited Time vs. No Time Instruction). Finally, as a first 
exploratory examination, we ran one last experiment where we directly explored differences in 
psychological distance.  
 
Pilot Study 
This research is primarily based on two versions of the Trolley Problem, the Switch version 
and the Fat Man version (see shortly), as these have been extensively shown to lead to utilitarian 
and deontological judgments, respectively (Greene, 2001). But, we also wanted to identify a 
scenario, in which the relative utilitarian and deontological influences would be reasonably well-
balanced. It is possible that Digital Context does affect the balance between deontological and 
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utilitarian choices, but predominant influences in the original scenarios are too strong and so 
suppress any effect. To obtain a Balanced version of the task we ran this pilot study. 
Method 
Sample 
Forty-two experimentally naïve students at City University London received course credit 
for participating in the study (31 women, 11 men; mean age=20 years, SD=3.1).   
Materials and Procedure 
 The experiment, designed in Qualtrics and run in a lab, lasted approximately 5 minutes. A 
Fat Man version of the Trolley Problem was presented. We modified the Fat Man scenario (briefly, 
one has to push a man onto the train tracks to avoid killing some workmen) by asking participants 
how many workmen they would need to save to be justified in taking the action. The aim was to 
maintain the emotionality of one of the choices but to increase the utilitarian weight of the other one 
by increasing the lives one could save. We refer to this scenario as the “Balanced” dilemma. 
The dilemma presented a scenario like this: “You are standing on a footbridge over a trolley 
track. You can see a trolley hurtling down the track, out of control. You turn around to see where 
the trolley is headed, and there are some workmen on the track that exists under the footbridge. 
What do you do? You know of one certain way to stop an out-of-control trolley: drop a really heavy 
weight in its path. But where to find one? It just so happens that standing next to you on the 
footbridge is a big fat man, a really big fat man. He is leaning over the railing watching the trolley; 
all you have to do is to give him a little shove, and over the railing he will go, onto the track in the 
path of the trolley.” Participants are normally asked to make a choice between (A): You can shove 
the man onto the track in the path of the train, killing him. Or (B): You can refrain from shoving the 
man onto the track, letting the workmen die. Instead, we asked participants not to choose one of the 
options but to write how many workmen would need to be saved, so that they would be undecided 
between Choice A and Choice B. In other words, how many "lives saved" would be needed, so that 
they do not know what to do, whether to shove the man (so killing him) or refrain from shoving the 
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man and letting the workmen die. Participant responses on the specific number of workmen to be 
saved were the dependent variable in this pilot. From the results of this experiment, we then 
specified the settings of the Balanced version of the Trolley Problem, in Experiment 1. 
 
Results Pilot Study 
Participant responses had a mean score of 150, a median of 15, a mode of 2 and a range of 
998. Based on these considerations, we decided to adopt the median response, 15 workers, for 
designing a corresponding balanced scenario. We so aimed to maintain the emotionality of one of 
the choices and to increase the utilitarian value of the other one, so that the scenario would have 
neither a utilitarian nor an emotional predominant bias. We used this Balanced version of the 
Trolley Problem together with the Switch and Fat Man dilemmas in Experiment 1.  
 
Experiment 1 
The objective was to explore whether a manipulation of the Digital Context (Smartphone vs. 
PC) can have an impact on moral judgment. Specifically, we wanted to test the hypothesis that 
making moral judgments using a Smartphone increase the number of utilitarian responses in 
comparison to when using a PC.  
Method 
Sample 
A total of 1010 participants, all US residents, were recruited on-line and received $1 for 
doing the task (482 women, 528 men; mean age=31.7 years, SD=9.6). Sample sizes were based on 
extant research (Hofmann et al. 2014; Suter & Hertwig, 2011) and were determined prior to the 
start of the experiments; the stopping rule for data collection was enforced automatically, as data 
collection was done through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
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The study was designed in Qualtrics, run on Amazon Mechanical Turk and lasted 
approximately 10-15 minutes. Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC)1 and Version of the Trolley 
Problem (Switch vs. Fat Man vs. Balanced) were manipulated between participants. We used the 
frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses as the dependent measure. 
Participants were randomly told to switch to a Smartphone or a PC after reading and 
agreeing the general instructions on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Having a smartphone was a pre-
requisite to participate in the experiment. Participants in the Smartphone condition had to respond 
to all questions from their smartphone devices. As a manipulation check for this condition, we 
tracked and verified through Qualtrics that the responses were indeed made from an iPhone, 
Android, Windows Phone or Blackberry. 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of these six conditions: (1) Smartphone/Switch; 
(2) Smartphone/Fat Man; (3) Smartphone/Balanced; (4) PC/Switch; (5) PC/Fat Man; (6) 
PC/Balanced.  
One third of the participants (327 Participants) on each Digital condition were presented 
with the Fat Man version of the Trolley dilemma, where one imagines standing on a footbridge 
overlooking a train track. A small incoming train is about to kill five people and the only way to 
stop it is to push a heavy man off the footbridge in front of the train. This will kill him, but save the 
five people. A utilitarian analysis dictates sacrificing one to save five; but this would violate the 
moral prohibition against killing. Imagining physically pushing the man is emotionally difficult and 
therefore people typically avoid this choice (Thomson, 1985). According to our hypotheses, 
participants would be more likely to opt for sacrificing one man to save five when dealing with such 
moral dilemma using a smartphone in comparison to a PC, since this would induce high construal, 
increase psychological distance and give rise to an abstract representation of actions, which is 
aligned with more utilitarian judgments under time pressure. 
                                                        1 In the Smartphone condition participants could do the experiment with the following devices: 
iPhone, Android, Windows Mobile Phone and BlackBerry. In the PC condition participants could 
use a desktop or a laptop computer. No tablets were allowed. 
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Another third of participants (313 Participants) were presented with the Switch dilemma, 
where the trolley is headed towards the five men, but you can switch it with a lever to another track, 
where it would kill only one man. People are more willing to sacrifice the one man by pulling the 
switch than by pushing him off the footbridge and the extensively supported explanation is that 
pulling the switch is less emotionally aversive. 
The last third of participants (314 Participants) were presented with the Balanced version of 
the Trolley Problem. The Balanced dilemma had a setting similar to that in the Fat Man version, but 
with a different number of people one could save (15 instead of 5), so that utilitarian choice would 
increase.  
All participants first completed a filler task (10 trivia questions) before responding to one of 
the versions of the Trolley Problem. A “catch question” was introduced in the experiment, to 
control for attention during the task (i.e. “If you are paying attention to this question please select 
answer ‘36’ from the options below”). Then, participants were presented with one of the three 
moral scenarios (Switch, Fat Man or Balanced) where they had to choose between Choice A 
(utilitarian) or Choice B (deontological). In all cases the dilemma was presented with both text and 
an illustration. Subsequently, participants completed another filler task (10 trivia questions). 
Finally, participants were asked to complete The Big Five Inventory (John et al., 1991) 
questionnaire, which is considered a quick (44-items), reliable, and accurate measure of the five 
dimensions of personality. We considered that the impact of digital content on moral choice could 
also interact with personality characteristics (Penner et al., 1995; Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006) but 
the results did not lead to firm conclusions and therefore will not be reported further. In Figure 1a 
we illustrate the experimental paradigm used for the Smartphone condition and in 1b the three 
moral conditions. 
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Fig. 1. A) The experimental paradigm used in the Smartphone condition in Experiment 1. B) The 
illustrations used in each of the three moral conditions (Switch, Fat Man and Balanced). 
 
Results Experiment 1 
We excluded participants whose first language was not English, as Costa et al., (2014) 
showed that the use of a foreign language (instead of a mother tongue) in a moral scenario increases 
psychological distance and induces utilitarianism when making moral judgments. We also excluded 
those participants who did not answer the catch question correctly. A total of 56 participants out of 
1010 were thus excluded (the numbers of participants per condition, for all experiments, are 
reported in the Supplemental Material). 
MORALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE   
 
13 
We first compared the percentage of Utilitarian Responses for the two Digital Contexts 
(Smartphone2 vs. PC) on each of the three Versions of the Trolley Problem that were employed 
(Switch vs. Fat Man vs. Balanced; Figure 2).  
 
Fig. 2.  Percentage of Utilitarian Responses for both Digital Contexts (Smartphone vs. PC) on each 
of the three versions of the Trolley problem (Switch vs. Fat Man vs. Balanced). Error bars represent 
standard errors3. 
As expected, in the Fat Man dilemma more participants avoided the act of pushing the 
heavy man off the footbridge in front of the train, presumably because of the emotional burden of 
this choice. More importantly, participants were more likely to opt for sacrificing the Fat Man 
(utilitarian response) to save five men when using a Smartphone (33.5%) than when using a PC 
(22.3%). A 2x2 chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the frequency of                                                         2 In the Smartphone condition, 39% of participants used an iPhone during the experiment, 58.5% an 
Android, 2.2% a Windows Mobile Phone and 0.2% a BlackBerry.   3 We computed errors bars for binary categorical data in this way: Let's say our estimate for the 
probability of assignment in a target category is p. Then 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = �pq
n
, where q = (1-p).  
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Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses against Digital Context in the Fat Man condition and this 
revealed a significant association between the variables, χ2 (1, N=327) = 5.15, p=.023. This result 
supports our hypothesis that moral judgments in Smartphones increase utilitarian decision-making, 
than when using a PC.  
We then analyzed the frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses, across the two 
Digital Contexts, in the Switch condition. Slightly more participants decided to sacrifice one man 
by pulling the switch than to do nothing and let five people die (80.9% for the Smartphone users; 
76.9% for the PC users), but there was no evidence for an association between the two variables, χ2 
(1, N=313) = .741, p=.389. This result supports our expectation that in less emotional scenarios, 
such as the Switch dilemma, there is a reduced effect of Digital Context. That is, there is no 
difference in participants’ moral judgments when using a Smartphone or a PC if the moral scenario 
is already highly utilitarian.  
Finally, we examined the frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses in the 
Balanced condition. Note, this condition was designed so that, in the PC condition at least, there 
would be fairly equivalent utilitarian and deontological influences, and this was approximately the 
case. Regarding the manipulation of interest, 40.4% of participants decided to push the heavy man 
off the footbridge in the PC and 36.7% in the Smartphone conditions. Nevertheless, a chi-square 
test of independence showed that the relation between these variables was not significant, χ2 (1, 
N=314) = .448, p=.503. The (tentative) conclusion from this experiment is that using a Smartphone 
rather than a PC has a reliable impact on moral judgments only when dilemmas or scenarios have 
high emotional content.  
 
Experiment 2a 
The objective of Experiment 2a was to provide additional evidence for the increased number 
of utilitarian responses using a Smartphone by manipulating the amount of time available to form a 
moral judgment. We wanted to test the hypothesis that moral judgments using a Smartphone 
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increase the number of utilitarian responses in comparison to when using a PC (under Time 
Constraint). It is possible that the effect of Digital Context is independent from that of Time 
Constraint, in which case we cannot explain the former in terms of (just) the latter. Alternatively, 
Time Constraint may provide a bias on moral decision making opposite to the effect of Digital 
Context (e.g., a decrease of utilitarian responses, in the fat man scenario, when participants are 
using a Smartphone), which will create a complex picture regarding how using Smartphones in 
everyday moral judgments biases for and against utilitarian responses. We also measured 
participants’ affective reaction with the Self Assessment Manikin test (Bradley and Lang, 1994).  
Method 
Sample 
A total of 250 participants, all of whom were US residents, were recruited on-line and 
received $0.80 for doing the task (114 women, 136 men; mean age=32.9 years, SD=9.1).   
Materials and Procedure 
The study was designed in Qualtrics, run on Amazon Mechanical Turk and lasted less than 
10 minutes. Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC), Version of the Trolley Problem (Switch vs. Fat 
Man) and Time Constraint (10 seconds vs. Unlimited Time to respond) were manipulated between 
participants. There were therefore eight conditions. We used the frequency of Utilitarian vs. 
Deontological Responses as the dependent measure. 
We followed the same procedure (verification and tracking methods) as in Experiment 1 for 
the Smartphone condition.  
All participants followed a similar procedure as in Experiment 1. They first completed a 
filler task (10 trivia questions) including a catch question, as in Experiment 1. Then, participants 
were presented with one of the two moral scenarios (Switch or Fat Man). In all cases the dilemma 
was presented with both text and an illustration. Participants were alerted of the available time for 
responding depending on their condition (i.e. “You will only have 10 seconds to answer the 
question in the next screen” vs. “You will have unlimited time to answer the question in the next 
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screen”). After the presentation of the scenario, in the “10 seconds” condition participants had to 
choose between Choice A (utilitarian) or Choice B (deontological), while a countdown timer 
appeared at the top of their screen (both Smartphone and PC). In contrast, in the “Unlimited Time” 
condition, participants were explicitly told that they had to make their judgment taking as much 
time as they wanted. Finally, participants were asked to complete the Self Assessment Manikin test 
(Bradley and Lang, 1994), which is a technique that directly measures the pleasure, arousal and 
dominance associated with a person’s affective reaction.  
 
Results Experiment 2a 
We excluded a total of 10 participants out of 250 following the same criteria as in 
Experiment 1 (participants were rejected if they answered the catch question incorrectly or if 
English was not their first language).  
As a manipulation check, we first examined the amount of time that participants took to 
finish the experiment. Overall, participants ended up spending more time in the Unlimited Time 
condition (5min 10s) than in the 10s condition (4min 32s), but this was not significant, t (238) = -
1.916, p = .057. This indicates that even in the time pressure condition participants had ample time 
to respond to the questions.  
We examined the differences in the percentage of Utilitarian Responses for the two Digital 
Contexts (Smartphone vs. PC) on each of the two versions of the Trolley Problem (Switch vs. Fat 
Man) and with or without time pressure (10s vs. Unlimited Time; Figure 3).  
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Fig. 3.  Percentage of Utilitarian Responses for both Digital Contexts (Smartphone vs. PC) on each 
of the two versions of the Trolley problem (Switch vs. Fat Man) depending on Time Constraint (10s 
vs. Unlimited Time). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
As in Experiment 1, all statistical tests involve the variables frequency of Utilitarian vs. 
Deontological Responses and Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC).  
In the time pressure (10s), Switch condition, slightly more participants decided to sacrifice 
one man by pulling the switch than to do nothing and let five people die, when using a Smartphone 
(79.31%) than when using a PC (66.67%), but this difference was not reliable, χ2 (1, N=65) = 1.282, 
p=.257.  
Regarding the Unlimited Time condition, in the Switch condition, Digital Context also did 
not appear to play a role in moral judgments (85.71% and 83.87% for Smartphone and PC, 
respectively); regardless of Digital Context, we observed highly utilitarian responses. Thus, as 
before, the results in the Switch dilemma indicate that Digital Context and (as it seems) Time 
Constraint have a reliable impact on moral judgments only when dilemmas or scenarios have high 
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emotional content. This result also supports our assumption that in less emotional scenarios, such as 
the Switch dilemma, any effect of either Digital Context or Time Constraint does not result in a 
reliable increase in utilitarian responding.  
In the time pressure (10s), Fat Man condition, participants were more likely to opt for 
sacrificing the Fat Man (utilitarian response) to save five when using a Smartphone (45.7%) than 
when using a PC (20.0%), χ2 (1, N=60) = 4.239, p=.04. At face value, these results support our 
hypothesis that, even under conditions of time pressure, some digital contexts (i.e. Smartphones) 
could trigger utilitarian decision-making.  
Finally, we examined participant’s responses in the Unlimited Time, Fat Man condition. The 
results here appear to conflict with our conclusion from Experiment 1, in that there was no 
difference in Utilitarian vs. Deontological responses, between the Smartphone and PC conditions 
(27.58% and 29.63%, respectively, χ2 (1, N=64) = 2.224, p=.136). In other words, when participants 
were specifically told to spend unlimited time to resolve the dilemma (Unlimited Time condition), 
the Digital Context effect vanished. We return to this finding in Experiment 2b.  
We also considered whether the impact of Digital Content on moral choice could interact 
with the perceived emotionality of the scenario/context or affective reactions, but the results did not 
lead us to firm conclusions and therefore will not be reported further (see Supplemental Material). 
 
Experiment 2b 
Experiments 1 and 2a left us with a challenge to explain the difference in the Fat Man 
condition of Experiment 1 and in the Unlimited Time condition in Experiment 2a (where the effect 
of Digital Context had disappeared). The key difference between these two conditions was that in 
Experiment 1 participants were not told anything regarding time, while in Experiment 2a, in the 
equivalent conditions, participants were specifically told they had unlimited time. It is possible that 
the requirement to keep track of time somehow interacted with other biases in moral decision-
making (such as arising from Digital Context). We hypothesized that with unlimited time 
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instructions, participants were encouraged to take into account the information about the dilemma 
they have been ignoring so far (which would include emotional cues, on the reasonable assumption 
that these were originally ignored) and this made the utilitarian bias disappear. In Experiment 2b we 
address this hypothesis directly by manipulating the Time Instruction to either specify that there 
was unlimited time available for a moral judgment, or not mentioning time at all (Instructing 
Unlimited Time vs. No Time Instruction). We only used the Fat Man scenario, as it is for this 
scenario that the effect of interest was observed. We also measured participants’ Response Time 
(i.e. the time participants took to read the dilemma and make the moral choice) as an additional 
manipulation check. 
Method 
Sample 
A total of 300 participants, all of whom were US residents, were recruited on-line and 
received $0.8 for doing the task (120 women, 180 men; mean age=32.2 years, SD=8.9).   
Materials and Procedure 
The study was designed in Qualtrics, run on Amazon Mechanical Turk and lasted less than 
10 minutes. Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC) and Time Instruction (Instructing Unlimited Time 
vs. No Time Instruction) were manipulated between participants, using the Fat Man scenario (see 
Experiment 1 for details). We used the frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses as the 
dependent measure. We also measured participants’ Response Time. 
Time Instruction was manipulated in the following way. Half the participants were given the 
instructions (as in the Experiment 2a Unlimited Time condition): “You will have unlimited time to 
answer the question in the next screen”. The other half did not have any indication of the time they 
had to spend making their judgment (same procedure as in Experiment 1). For the rest of the task, 
all participants followed a similar procedure as in Experiment 1 and 2a. We also employed the same 
verification/ tracking methods as in Experiments 1, 2a for the Smartphone condition. Finally, 
because of the large samples in Experiments 1, 2a, in this experiment we included an additional 
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question regarding whether participants had taken part ‘in a similar trolley experiment before’. We 
informed them that there would be no penalty for an affirmative response (i.e., the participant could 
still do the experiment and get paid normally).   
 
Results across all Experiments 1, 2a and 2b   
In this section we report the results of Experiment 2b and then bring together the results 
from Experiments 1, 2a and 2b, focusing on the Fat Man scenario (Figure 4).  
First, we summarize the results from Experiment 2b. In this experiment we excluded a total 
of 141 participants out of 300 (the total number of participants per condition are reported in the 
Supplemental Material) following the same criteria as in Experiment 1 and 2a. One participant was 
rejected because she/he answered incorrectly to the catch question and one because English was not 
his/her first language. Additionally, 139 participants were eliminated because they said they had 
come across a moral choice in the context of the Trolley Problem before. The pattern of results does 
not change qualitatively if these participants are included, but we decided not to do so.  
In this experiment we measured Response Time for the particular moral judgment, though 
we note that, as the experiment was run over the internet, the accuracy of these measurements is 
lower than in the lab. Did participants in the Instructing Unlimited Time condition take longer to 
respond than ones in the No Time Instruction one? There was no evidence that this was the case 
(2x2 ANOVA with Digital Context and Time Instruction, F<1 for all effects). We suggest that the 
effects from Time Constraint and Time Instruction seen in Experiments 2a, 2b could result in a 
change of the participants’ mind-set and approach to the problems, without corresponding clear 
differences in Response Time.  
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Fig. 4.  Summary of the relevant results from Experiments 1, 2a and 2b for the Fat Man problem. 
The vertical axis shows percentage of utilitarian responses and the horizontal axis the conditions of 
interest. Error bars represent standard errors.  
 
The two leftmost bar clusters in Figure 4 show the results of Experiment 2b. Interestingly, 
using the data from Experiment 2b, we replicated the finding from Experiment 2a, that the mere 
fact of “nudging” participants to use unlimited time resulted in utilitarian responses that were not 
influenced by Digital Context. A 2x2 chi-square test with frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological 
Responses against Time Instruction (Instructing Unlimited Time vs. No Time Instruction) 
confirmed this conclusion, χ2 (1) = 5.509, p = .018.  
We next considered whether the results from Experiments 2b replicated the effect from 
Experiments 1 and 2a regarding Digital Context. The pattern of results from the No Time 
Instruction condition in Experiment 2b closely matched the corresponding results in Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2b, as expected, participants were more likely to opt for sacrificing the Fat Man 
(utilitarian response) to save five when using a Smartphone (28.6%) than when using a PC (19%). 
Even though the trend was as expected, a 2x2 chi-square test with frequency of Utilitarian vs. 
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Deontological Responses against Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC) was not significant, χ2 (1, 
N=70) = 0.864, p=.35. However, after collapsing the data (for the identical Fat Man, No Time 
Instruction conditions) from Experiments 1 and 2b, we obtained a significant association between 
frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses and Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC), χ2 
(1, N=397) = 6.27, p=.012. This result supports our hypothesis that moral judgments in 
Smartphones increase utilitarian decision-making, compared to when using a PC, when no 
information about time is provided.  
Importantly, the results from Experiments 1, 2a and 2b put together indicate that under 
conditions of no time information and time pressure there is indeed a utilitarian bias. The only Time 
Instruction in which the utilitarian bias was eliminated was the Unlimited Time condition, in which 
participants were specifically told to take as long as they needed to respond. This finding has a 
plausible interpretation that, in the Unlimited Time condition, participants took into account the 
information they have been ignoring so far (which would include emotional cues) and this made the 
utilitarian bias disappear. Thus, the results so far support the hypothesis that, under most conditions, 
smartphones (vs. PC) are associated with more utilitarian decision-making (vs. deontological). An 
additional interesting finding is that utilitarian judgments emerge in both the No Time Instruction 
condition and the Time Pressure condition. This latter finding presents a route for extending the 
dual route model of moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2001), which currently incorporates an 
assumption that more hurried judgments are more likely to lead to deontological judgments (though 
we stress that even in the Time Pressure condition participants would have had ample time to 
respond).  
 
Experiment 3 
A reasonable interpretation of the results in Experiments 1, 2a and 2b is that the increase in 
utilitarian judgments is due to an induction of high construal, increasing psychological distance and 
giving rise to an abstract representation of actions. This interpretation is supported by the idea of 
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‘narrowing focus’, which has been put forward regarding the use of smartphones (Ariely, 2016). In 
Experiment 3 we attempt to provide a preliminary investigation to further support this 
interpretation, by measuring psychological distance and by overall more complete manipulation of 
Time (No Time Instruction vs. Unlimited Time vs. Time Pressure). We only used the Fat Man 
scenario, as it is for this scenario that the effect of interest was observed. We also measured 
participants’ response time. 
Method 
Sample 
A total of 1211 participants, all of whom were US residents, were recruited on-line and 
received $0.8 for doing the task (587 women, 624 men; mean age=31.82 years, SD=9.43).   
Materials and Procedure 
The study was designed in Qualtrics, run on Amazon Mechanical Turk and lasted less than 
10 minutes. Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC) and Time (No Time Instruction vs. Unlimited 
Time vs. Time Pressure) were manipulated between participants, using the Fat Man scenario (see 
Experiment 1 for details). We used the frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses as the 
dependent measure. We also measured psychological distance and participants’ response time. 
Regarding the time manipulation, one third of participants were not provided with any 
indication of time for making their judgment (No Time). Participants in the Unlimited Time 
condition were instructed as follows: “You will have unlimited time to answer the question in the 
next page. Think carefully about your judgment before responding”. Participants in the Time 
Pressure condition were presented with the following instructions: “The question in the next page 
should be answered as fast as possible. Use your first impression/ gut feeling in order to respond”; 
these participants had to make their moral choice while a timer (at the top of their screen) kept track 
of elapsed time. For the rest of the task, all participants followed a similar procedure as in 
Experiment 1, 2a and 2b. We also employed the same verification/ tracking methods as in the 
previous experiments for the Smartphone condition. Then, participants had to respond a measure of 
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psychological distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010) (e.g., “How distant do you feel yourself from the 
scenario when making your decision?”) moving a slider that went from 0 (really close) to 7 (far 
away). Finally, as in Experiment 2b, because of the large samples in the previous experiments, we 
included an additional question regarding whether participants had taken part ‘in a similar trolley 
experiment before’.  
 
Results Experiment 3 
We excluded a total of 546 participants out of 1211 because they said they had come across 
a moral choice in the context of the Trolley Problem before. (Note, it may appear wasteful not 
including such a proportion of the recruited participants, nevertheless we were surprised by the 
number of participants who had come across the Trolley Problem)  
As a manipulation check regarding time, we examined the amount of time that participants 
took to make their judgments. Participants spent more time responding in the Unlimited Time 
condition (14.28s) than in the No Time condition (12.53s) and than in the Time Pressure condition 
(7.5s). A one-way between subjects ANOVA for these means was significant (F(2, 662) = 6.505, p 
= .002). A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that all pairwise comparisons between groups were 
significant (p = .023) but the No Time and Unlimited Time comparison was not (p = .648).  
It is questionable as to whether the measure of distance we employed was sensitive enough, 
even though it is a standard way of measuring distance in related research (Trope & Liberman, 
2010). It is primarily for this reason that the results of this experiment ought to be considered 
preliminary, though one also needs to point to the depletion of participants in answering the Trolley 
Problem (approximately 50% of the sample was not naïve). Notwithstanding these qualifications, 
we examined whether different levels of psychological distance reflected the expected differences 
regarding moral changes (Figure 5). We selected participants who reported Low vs. High levels of 
distance (i.e. ≤ 2 points and ≥ 4 points in the 7 Likert scale, respectively).  
MORALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE   
 
25 
As expected, participants who reported high levels of distance under time pressure were 
more likely to opt for the utilitarian response (40.22%) than the ones who reported low ones 
(26.61%). A 2x2 chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the frequency of 
Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses against Low vs. High levels of distance in the Time 
Pressure condition and this revealed a significant association between the variables, χ2 (1, N=201) = 
4.19, p=.04.  
Interestingly, utilitarian responses were also more likely for participants who reported low 
levels of distance under No Time Instruction (33% vs. 24.24%), indicating utilitarian responses can 
follow this alternative route (low distance, No Time Instruction). A 2x2 chi-square test of 
independence was performed to examine the frequency of Utilitarian vs. Deontological Responses 
against Low vs. High levels of distance in the No Time condition but it was not significant, F<1.  
Finally, we suggest, as in Experiment 2b, that the Unlimited Time condition produces 
conflicting results due to the fact that participants are encouraged to take into account information 
that they may otherwise have ignored, including emotional valence information for the High 
Distance participants.  
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Fig. 5. Percentage of Utilitarian Responses for both low and high levels of distance depending on 
Time (No Time vs. Unlimited Time vs. Time Pressure). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
General Discussion 
This is one of the first studies to look at the impact of digital context in moral judgments. 
We considered whether the increasing tendency for our judgments to be mediated through the use 
of technological gadgets might be changing our approach to moral dilemmas. We have shown that 
people’s moral judgments become more utilitarian (vs. deontological) when using Smartphones as 
opposed to PCs, under a variety of time-related manipulations (but not all). The present work was 
motivated by the idea that Smartphones (vs. PCs) channel or tunnel the focus toward a main task 
and ignore or filter out certain cues (Ariely, 2016). This would induce high construal, increase 
psychological distance and give rise to an abstract representation of actions, which is aligned with 
more utilitarian judgments (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Gong, Iliev, & Sachdeva, 2012; Aguilar, 
Brussino, & Fernández-Dols, 2013). In other words, Digital Context might impact the relation 
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between different levels of construal (psychological distance) thus affecting utilitarian vs. 
deontological judgments. While our results are consistent with such a view, clearly further research 
is needed.  
We first consider the implications of these results for the Dual-Process Models of Moral 
Judgment (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007). A 
standard assumption is that moral dilemmas resolved in fast, gut-feeling conditions engage a 
deontological mode of responding, while utilitarian responses are typically the result of longer 
consideration and involve cognitive control. Instead, we showed that participants under time 
pressure were more likely to opt for sacrificing the “fat man” to “save five” (utilitarian response) 
when using a Smartphone than when using a PC. That is, some digital contexts (i.e. Smartphones) 
can trigger utilitarian decision-making under time pressure, even though time pressure has 
traditionally been associated with deontological responding in moral choice. Dual route models 
have received extensive support and no doubt they are valid under most circumstances. Our results 
indicate a need to perhaps augment the available routes for utilitarian biases in such models.  
Other research has provided a more complex picture regarding the impact of time on 
deontological vs. utilitarian judgments (Greene et al., 2001, 2007, 2009). Specifically, Suter and 
Hertwig (2011) showed that participants in a time-pressure condition (associated with fast, gut-
feeling conditions), relative to a no-time-pressure condition (associated with longer consideration 
and higher cognitive control), were more likely to give deontological responses only in high-
conflict dilemmas. By contrast, in low-conflict and in impersonal dilemmas, the proportion of 
deontological responses did not differ between conditions. The results from the present experiments 
partly support these differences between high-low conflict dilemmas. In less emotional scenarios 
(Switch), neither Digital Context nor Time Constraint resulted in a reliable increase in utilitarian 
responding. By contrast, in more emotional scenarios (Fat Man), our results question the well-
established assumption (from Suter & Hertwig, 2011, amongst others) that hurried decisions 
enhance deontology, since we showed that moral judgments under a time constraint and in a context 
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promoting a narrowing effect (Smartphones) seem to make utilitarian judgments more common. 
More importantly, the recent studies from Kusev et al. (2016), suggesting that any emotional 
interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, is an artifact of presenting partial 
information and does not happen when full information is presented, with rational choices taking 
less time. Could it be the case that Digital Context might influence the variation in accessibility to 
utilitarian information, as they suggest? We consider this is a potential hypothesis for further 
research. 
We next consider the results regarding the time instructions in Experiments 2a, 2b and 3. 
We suggest that the instructions regarding timing (i.e. “You will only have 10 seconds…” or “You 
will have unlimited time…”) induce different mind-sets for making the moral judgments, for 
example, one of ‘pressure’ (regardless of whether in actual fact the time is sufficient or not) vs. one 
of a requirement to consider the issue carefully and take into account as much information as 
possible (again, regardless of how much time is actually spent on the problem). Clearly, more work 
is required to disentangle possible explanations for the exact effect of the different instructions 
concerning timing, especially regarding the possibility that keeping track of time may result in 
reduced cognitive resources.  But the crucial point regarding the present study is that our conclusion 
considering Digital Context and moral judgments appears mostly independent of such 
considerations.  
Our hypotheses regarding Digital Context and moral decision-making was largely motivated 
from the narrowing effect and the implications from Construal Level Theory. There is an 
impressive body of evidence showing that psychological distance affects judgments and decisions 
in a wide range of psychological domains. According to CLT, psychological distance can vary on at 
least four dimensions: temporal, spatial, social and hypotheticality (i.e. probability for a scenario to 
become reality; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Can we localize the particular effect of distance in 
considering responding using a smartphone vs. a PC? In Experiment 3, we attempted to measure 
psychological distance directly, though there is a question regarding the validity of the 
MORALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE   
 
29 
corresponding measure. Our results indicate that participants who reported high levels of distance 
under time pressure were more likely to opt for utilitarian responses than the ones who reported low 
ones. Interestingly, utilitarian responses were also more likely for participants who reported low 
levels of distance under no time information, thus replicating the results from Korner and Volk 
(2014) and another paper from the authors of this manuscript (under review). Korner and Volk 
(2014) showed that cognitive capacity moderates construal level effects on moral dilemma 
judgments. Participants made more deontological judgments under concrete-low (vs. abstract-high) 
construal when they were under time pressure. This pattern reversed when participants had 
sufficient time, resulting in more deontological judgments under abstract-high (vs. concrete-low) 
construal. In contrast to prior work on moral judgments, which mostly links deontology to intuitive 
processing and utilitarianism to deliberation, their findings suggest that deontological judgments 
can result from at least two different mechanisms, a conclusion which is broadly consistent with the 
present findings from Experiment 3 and from a paper of the authors of this manuscript (under 
review; though clearly this is an issue that cannot be resolved easily).  
More generally, our results were inconclusive regarding the idea that the psychological 
distance elicited by a smartphone decreased the intensity of people’s affective reactions. It is 
possible that smartphones induce a greater distance in other respects or that an alternative procedure 
regarding the measurement of affective reaction may be more effective. For example, it might be 
the case that the use of digital devices interacts with/mediates the hypotheticality dimension. 
Therefore, we suggest that the standard dimensions for psychological distance and CLT need be 
further studied using alternative methods too.  
We note that insights from contemporary morality research have mostly been acquired 
through moral vignettes, questionnaire data and thought experiments such as trolley problems. As 
important as these approaches are, they are all limited by the artificial nature of the stimuli used and 
the non-natural settings in which they are embedded. Using Ecological Momentary Assessment 
(Hoffman et al., 2014) would perhaps be a better way to capture moral events, experiences, and 
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dynamics as they unfold in people’s natural environments.  
Overall, as noted, Kiesler et al. (1984) and Walther (1996) started the debate on how social 
psychological research might contribute to a deeper understanding of the effects of technological 
change in society on behavior. They argued that perhaps the medium itself has no consistent effects 
but that different conditions surrounding computer-mediated communication (i.e. Digital Context) 
can lead to interesting and contrasting behavioural outcomes. For example, in recent years, there 
have been some concerns that the increasing use of technology in (moral) decision-making and/ or 
communication may have an overall adverse effect (e.g. regarding the proportionate influence of 
personal/impersonal information on perceptions of emotionality, the role of social context 
information on empathy, the emergence of new shared norms governing its use, etc.). It seems 
reasonable to think that new information and communication technologies may influence human 
behaviour but, on the other hand, people may learn how to use these technologies and adapt to them 
(i.e. they develop media literacy), which might continuously lead to changes and variations to any 
currently established effects. The present work reveals a need for the further systematic study of 
how Digital Context affects moral choice, all the more so given that, increasingly, governments, 
charities and other institutions engage in intense campaigns over digital media to encourage moral 
choices for important aspects of our way of life. We hope this work motivates further studies to 
shed some light in the ethical dimensions of Human-Machine Interaction and Artificial Intelligence 
fields.    
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